India and the European Union (EU) have chosen to anticipate security cooperation with the India-EU Connectivity Partnership, even as India encourages maritime cooperation with different EU member states such as France. [3] Similarly, opportunities for cooperation on common development goals between like-minded partners, including Japan, India and France, are identified. For example, given the convergence of interests on east Africa`s importance in the Indo-Pacific, the slow (but widely anticipated) partnership between the three countries could soon involve joint development investments in Africa. In addition, a trilateral agreement is already advocated[4], given France`s regional investments (such as the €2 billion transport contract in Kenya) as part of its efforts to change the postcolonial approach to “Françafrique” and the “Platform for Japan-India Trade Cooperation in Asia-Africa” between the Japan Foreign Trade Organization and the Indian Confederation of Indian Industry. [5] Under former US President Donald Trump, India was recognized as a central player in the US`s Indo-Pacific strategy, which resulted in the name change of the US Pacific Command based in Hawaii to the Indo-Pacific Command and a political focus on promoting India`s rise as a regional security provider in the Indian Ocean region. This has led to increased attention to India`s naval capabilities in bilateral defense trade,[8] with Trump yielding to longstanding Indian demands for specific platforms (such as the MH-60 Romeo Seahawk sea helicopters) and lifting the Obama administration`s halt on India`s acquisition of US-made unmanned systems (to offer India the Sea Guardian maritime drone). In addition, the Trump administration has proactively released significant additional naval equipment for India`s fleet of US-made P8I Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft (see Table 1), such as MK 54 torpedoes and AGM-84L Harpoon missiles. [9] Trump also accepted Indian requests to purchase 5-inch/62-caliber MK 45 naval guns. The Trump administration has also hired two unarmed Sea Guardian drones to support India`s reconnaissance efforts amid border tensions with China. [10] While the U.S.-India partnership includes several nodes, including trade, technology, climate, global health, immigration, and institutional standards, dialogue and analysis focus on deepening the defense partnership. Since 2015, the U.S.
has also approved more than $3 billion in defense items to India through the DCS process, which allows the export of controlled defense manufacturing equipment, services, and technology in the 21 categories of the U.S. Munitions List (USML). The main dcs categories for India during this period were military electronics (USML XI category); Fire control equipment, laser, imaging and guidance (category XII); and aircraft and related items. Maritime safety as a public asset. India wants to build dual-use naval capabilities and institutions that strengthen its defences and receive regional support through the provision of public goods. The U.S. is expected to help India acquire sensors, signal processing and data fusion capabilities so that MDA can generate information that can be distributed in the Indian Ocean region (IOR). The U.S. discussion on MDA should be shaped positively in order to promote maritime safety, the economy and ecology. After the next Malabar exercise, the quad navies should add an anti-narcotics exercise or humanitarian aid as a visible public good and invite all countries in the region as observers. Rhetorical adjustments. India remains cautious in the face of a blatant confrontation with China, expecting asymmetrical support from the US and protecting its autonomy and sphere of influence.
==References=====External links===The official rhetoric about the partnership should focus on: discreet and less visible cooperation on China – such as intelligence, maritime security and cybersecurity; strengthening India`s sovereignty and development; frequent consultations and coordination on India`s neighbourhood; and the long-term pursuit by the United States of greater strategic reciprocity. [29] Edward Ashbee, “US-India defence ties `socialising` India into the Indo-Pacific calculus,” Observer Research Foundation, August 29, 2019, www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/us-india-defence-ties-socialising-india-indo-pacific-calculus-54884/ The virtual dialogue included more than 20 hours of discussion, spread over several plenary sessions. In addition, numerous preliminary meetings, parallel consultations, after-action discussions, and individual follow-up conversions resulted in more than 40 hours of restricted conversations to inform this report. .